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Abstract 
 
Survey data from Bulgaria show that people who had experienced a loss during a banking crisis 
are significantly more likely to expect a new crisis. This result holds despite 12 years between 
the earlier crisis and the survey, and the dramatically improved performance of the financial 
sector and the economy in the meantime. However, we find that earlier experiences affect 
expectations only for less informed individuals. Individuals who are more informed about the 
economy are unaffected by their prior experiences.  
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I.  Introduction 
The first and foremost promise made by banks to depositors is to keep their money safe, a 
promise that has generally been kept, building trust and enabling financial intermediation to 
flourish across countries.  However, this promise has been breached on occasion during some 
banking crises resulting in the loss of depositor savings.  After such a loss, how long does it take 
for people to regain confidence in banks?  It is human nature to forget.  If memories are short, 
the period needed to revive trust in banks may be only a few years.  People might also believe 
that the crisis was a fluke or that it reflected economic conditions that are no longer at play.  
Again, trust could be regained fairly rapidly.  However, it is also possible that the crisis 
permanently enters people’s beliefs about the operations of an economy and how it can go 
wrong.  After all, if it happened once, what can guarantee it will not happen again?   
We provide evidence on the effect of an earlier banking crisis on future expectations 
using unique survey data from Bulgaria.  Bulgaria’s banking system imploded in 1996, midway 
through its transition from communism.  Many people lost much of their savings.  Twelve years 
later, in 2008, a national household survey asked respondents about the likelihood of a banking 
crisis during the next months or years.  It also inquired about peoples’ experiences during the 
crisis in 1996.  These two questions allow us to test how prior experiences with a banking crisis 
condition expectations of another crisis.   
We find that people who lost money in 1996 were significantly more likely to expect a 
new crisis.  This result is robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, to corrections 
for reverse causality and measurement error, to various definitions of the dependent and key 
independent variables, and to various econometric methods.  Given the length of time and more 
recent, sustained stability and growth in the Bulgarian economy, this persistent effect of a past 
negative experience on current expectations indicates how difficult it is to regain trust in the 
financial sector.
1  
Our findings also indicate that there is heterogeneity in the influence of past experience 
across different individuals. We find that prior experiences are more influential on the 
                                                 
1 A recent advertising leaflet by a Bulgarian bank illustrates the problem of incomplete trust facing banks. The top 
half of the page features photos of a jar filled with sugar, a mattress, a pair of shoes, a shelf with books, and several 
other places where people usually hide cash. The message below the photos reads: “If we know where you keep the 
money, they also know”; “they” are, of course, the thieves. The implicit message is to deposit the money in the bank 
instead. This campaign would not be necessary if people believed that bank deposits were risk free.  3 
 
expectations of those individuals who are less informed about the economy.  In contrast, the 
expectations of more informed people are unaffected by their experiences during the 1996 crisis. 
That result is consistent with models of heterogeneous agents such as Haltiwanger and 
Waldman (1985) which question the assumption of full rational expectations across all 
individuals.  For some individuals in a new, changed economic environment, past events from a 
very different economic system do not influence expectations, a result consistent with rational 
expectations.  However, other individuals continue to look backwards and appear not to go 
through the process of assessing the new conditions.  
The paper makes contributions to three broad strands of the literature.  First, it provides 
direct evidence, on the micro level, that crises affect expectations for a long time.  Studying the 
Great Depression, Cagan (1965) modeled the expectations of the future rate of loss on deposits 
as depending on some average of the past experience of losses.  Calvo’s (1986) paper on 
“temporary stabilizations” builds on a similar idea in the context of currency crises: in countries 
with a history of crises, economic agents do not expect stabilizations to be permanent.  The 
hysteresis of currency substitution, i.e. that dollarization increases during high inflation but does 
not decline once inflation has declined, has also been explained by persistent expectations of 
renewed instability, e.g. Melvin and Fenske (1992).  In short, the notion that crises have lasting 
effects on expectations is in the literature.  However, to our knowledge, the results presented here 
are the first direct evidence on this effect.  
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on trust and financial development.  Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2004), Knack and Keefer (1997) and others show that trust and social 
capital are essential determinants of financial development.  Yet, little is known about the 
determinants of trust.  Our results make a contribution in this regard, showing that a banking 
crisis can reduce confidence for over a decade.  
The third contribution is that the paper shows evidence for a strong backward-looking 
component in the formation of expectations and for substantial variation in the effect of past 
experiences on expectations across the population.  The process of expectations formation is 
central to economics and continues to attract significant research interest, e.g. Sargent (1982) and 
Branch (2004).  The heterogeneity in terms of information endowments and expectations 
formation has also been studied extensively, e.g. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and Mankiw 
and Reis (2002).  These are, of course, large issues that cannot be settled with our data.  Yet, we 4 
 
are able to assess the effect of one important potential influence on expectations – a sweeping 
banking crisis.  Understanding how banking crises affect expectations is important for 
policymakers seeking to convince a population that new economic policy reforms have moved 
the economy to a new structure immune from past problems.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The following section presents brief 
background notes on Bulgaria’s banking and currency crisis in 1996 as well as information on 
economic performance since that time.  The next section includes the basic theoretical construct 
of our question on expectations formation and the influence of past events.  We then describe the 
survey instrument before leading into the regression model and the estimation results.  Finally 
we offer some concluding comments. 
 
II.  The 1996 Financial Crisis in Bulgaria  
Bulgaria experienced one of the sharpest financial crises in Eastern Europe during its 
transition from socialism.  During the banking crisis in 1996 and the first months of 1997, 
56.3 percent of the loans on the books of state-owned banks were classified as “non-standard”, 
i.e. loans with payment delays or outright defaults.  Even worse, 66.7 percent of the loans of 
smaller privately owned banks were non-standard (BNB, 1996).  Throughout 1996, the 
government attempted to assist banks by infusing large amounts of government funds but, 
eventually, a number of banks collapsed and the infusion of money into the financial system set 
off inflation.  Berlemann, Hristov, and Nenovsky (2002) detail how the crisis unfolded and the 
government response: 
 “Chronologically, the first wave of the crisis came from the banking system when in the 
end of May 1996 BNB [The Bulgarian Central Bank] took 5 commercial banks, 3 of 
which were private, under conservatorship. The attack on the banks was triggered by 
depositors’ expectations that their foreign deposits would be confiscated or frozen by the 
government in order to allow it to meet its interest payments on the external debt due in 
July (there were several indications that the government could do so). The fact that 
Bulgaria had no agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996 
reinforced this fear. The deposits from the bankrupt banks were transferred to the sound 
ones and at the same time a Law for Bank Deposit Guarantee passed the Parliament. 
According to this law the government had to repay the full amounts of individuals’ 
deposits with bankrupt banks and 50 percent of enterprises’ deposits. At first, individuals 
were allowed to draw their deposits in BGN [the domestic money] before the court 
declared its decision on closed banks (withdrawals of foreign currency deposits were in 
portions). The money withdrawn was quickly directed to the foreign currency market 5 
 
where BGN got under pressure. Later on, this permission was abolished and BGN 
deposits were also blocked. Altogether, throughout 1996 depositors lost more than 
50 percent of their savings.”
2 
 
The financial crisis had been building for some time as Bulgaria was slow in reforming 
its real economy (see Berlemann, Hristov, and Nenovsky 2002 and Dobrinsky 2000).  Both state-
owned banks and many private banks channeled funds to inefficient state-owned enterprises the 
government considered too important to liquidate.  Credits to these firms often served merely as 
stop-gap efforts either to cover losses or service existing loans. While the infusion of funds 
enabled them to continue to operate, eventually these firms could no longer service their debts.  
In the meantime, the liberalization of financial markets and the lax supervision resulted in the 
creation of a number of new private banks that were poorly managed and served primarily to 
generate funds for the business activities of their owners.  Further adding to the difficulties of the 
banking sector, corruption and government interference in lending was widespread. 
Following the crisis, the government embarked on massive structural reforms privatizing 
and liquidating loss-making state-owned enterprises.  The government also withdrew from the 
private credit market and privatized all state-owned banks, in most cases selling them to foreign 
banks.  By the time of the survey in 2008, more than 90 percent of Bulgarian banks had been 
owned and operated by foreign banks for several years.  The change in ownership and improved 
environment had led to substantial investment in banking services and generated a network of 
branch locations throughout the country.  Various financial services such as mortgages, credit for 
small firms, a range of saving accounts, electronic payments, and personal and business lines of 
credit had been introduced.  Further, prudential supervision and regulation had strengthened 
substantially.  In addition, a transparent and fairly generous deposit insurance system had been 
implemented.  
In the broader macroeconomic context, in 1997 Bulgaria introduced a currency board 
with a peg to the German mark and later to the euro.  Within months, the new currency board 
lowered inflation to single digits.  Economic growth also accelerated.  Bulgaria experienced 
strong annual growth from the time it ended the largest structural reforms around 2000.  At the 
time of the survey, there were no indications of economic slowdown or risks in the banking 
                                                 
2 Although eventually depositors were allowed access to their deposits, their real value had been erased by the sharp 
inflation and currency depreciation. 6 
 
system.  The percentage of loans considered “non-standard” was well below 5 percent.  Entry 
into the EU and NATO provided assurance to foreign investors who poured in significant 
amount of funds.  
Bulgaria continues to have a high level of corruption, weak governance, and a low level 
of income.  Yet, objectively, the fundamental reasons for the 1996 banking crisis had been 
largely resolved well in advance of May 2008, when the survey was carried out.  At the time of 
the survey, it was also months before the global financial crisis began.  When the crisis started, 
Bulgaria’s banks came under pressure to raise liquidity but they continued to provide a full range 
of services and stabilized within months without direct government intervention.   
 
III.  The Formation of Expectations 
Economic theory has long recognized that past events can affect future expectations.  As 
noted earlier, Cagan (1965) modeled the expectations of the future rate of loss on deposits as 
depending on some average of the past experience of losses.  We extend this type of expectations 
modeling by proposing that individual experiences of a past event may differ causing them to 
vary in their influence.
3  When an individual is directly and negatively affected by a past event, it 
is reasonable to expect that the memory of the event will be stronger and that this past event will 
be weighted more heavily in forming expectations.  For example, a person who had recently 
been involved in a traffic accident at a particular intersection will likely have a higher assessment 
of the danger of this intersection, and be more cautious, than another person who had merely 
read about the accident in a newspaper account.
 4  
The influence of such an experience on expectations may diminish over time, especially 
if the structures associated with the event change.  Returning to our victim of a traffic accident, if 
a new traffic light is installed in the intersection, the individual may reduce his assessment of its 
danger.  In our case, in Bulgaria, while many people suffered losses in the 1996 banking crisis, 
                                                 
3 Akerloff and Schiller (2009), in discussing the causes of the run on banks of the 1890’s Depression, describe 
stories of earlier bank runs forming a “social memory” among the population. This social memory facilitated the 
development of an instinct to avoid losses when “something did not look right” by withdrawing funds. Here, rather 
than an indirect social memory, we focus on individual memories formed from direct experiences. 
4 An assumption that negative experiences affect behavior seems reasonable as it is also used in the psychology 
literature. For example, an interesting stream of research in experimental psychology examines the effects of 
planting false memories into subjects. Bernstein (2009) notes the basic premise: “It seemed natural to assume that if 
a person had a bad experience with some object, then that person might avoid that object later.” One study shows 
that individuals are willing to pay less for a Disney Pluto souvenir after the implantatation of a false memory of a 
negative experience as a child with the Pluto character at Disneyland (Berkowitz, et al, 2008).   7 
 
economic structures have changed drastically in recent years.  Past events such as the 1996 
banking crisis may no longer be perceived as relevant when forming expectations using all 
available information. 
To formalize this, we assume individuals form their expectations of the future using their 
understanding of both past events and current economic conditions, including any changes in 
economic structures (Sheffrin, 1996).  With no information costs, individuals would use all 
available information.  However, analyzing information is costly and the extent to which 
individuals search for and process information about changing economic structures depends on 
the marginal cost and perceived marginal gain of engaging in this activity.  Feige and 
Pierce (1976) refer to this as “economically rational expectations.”  The processing of 
information, particularly of new economic structures, may be affected by a number of factors, 
including the cost of accessing information, levels of human capital that reflect an individual’s 
ability to process information, relative wealth that raises the gain from collecting information, 
etc.  As individuals face different costs and expected gains, they may differ in the extent to 
which they gather and assess information.  This gives rise to heterogeneity in terms of 
expectations formation that has been investigated by Feige and Pierce (1976), Haltiwanger and 
Waldman (1985), Branch (2004), Sethi and Franke (1995) and others.  
We operationalize this idea of heterogeneity by dividing the survey respondents into two 
groups.  “Naïve” agents have less information as a result of either relatively higher costs or lower 
expected benefits which reduces their information processing activity (IPA).  They depend more 
on past events, particularly past experience, in forming their expectations.  “Sophisticated” 
agents are more motivated to collect and interpret information, i.e. have higher IPA.  Having a 
better understanding of current economic conditions and structures, they rely less on past 
experiences in forming their expectations,.  Thus in our simple model, naïve agents weigh past 
experiences more heavily than sophisticated agents in their expectations formation.
5  
A differential effect of the 1996 crisis on the expectations of different groups of people is 
not a foregone conclusion.  It may be that some kind of social memory rather than individual 
experiences determine the effect of past events on expectations.  In this case individual 
                                                 
 
5 We adopt Haltiwanger and Waldman’s terms of “naïve” and “sophisticated” for convenience.  Although we utilize 
a number of variables to separate respondents into the two groups, we view the differences to reflect varying costs 
and benefits of analyzing information and not the character of individuals assigned to one group or the other.  8 
 
experiences should have no differential effect.  It could be the case that informed individuals 
continue to form their expectations based on the past crisis.  Despite recognition of a changed 
economic environment, the informed could maintain the view that if a crisis happened before it is 
likely to happen again.  Similarly, the less informed individuals might ignore or might have 
forgotten their experience from 12 years ago.  Given these uncertainties, whether and how the 
past crisis in Bulgaria continues to affect expectations across different groups of individuals is an 
empirical question.  
 
IV.  Survey Data and Empirical Methodology 
Our data are taken from a national survey of households carried out in May 2008.  The 
survey polled 1000 households, a standard sample size for national surveys of Bulgaria’s 
population of 8 million.  The sampling ensured representativeness with respect to demographics 
such as income, place of residence, education, and age.  The data were collected by professional 
interviewers at the residence of each household.  The survey project was conducted and 
supervised by an established Bulgarian polling agency, Vitosha Research.  It included questions 
on the banking system that are used in this paper as well as a range of other questions on social 
and political topics.
6  The question about expectations of a banking crisis was formulated as 
follows: 
“In your opinion, how likely is it that the Bulgarian banking system will experience a 
crisis with several banks collapsing and depositors losing some of their savings during 
the next 6 months/1 year/5 years?”
7 
 
Table I reveals doubts among the respondents in the stability of the banking system.   About 
13 percent of the respondents believed that a banking crisis was likely or very likely (categories 
1 and 2) even at the 6 months horizon.  Confidence in the stability of the banking system 
diminishes the longer the time horizon.  Twenty four percent of respondents believed that a 
                                                 
6 The survey documentations along with the data are available from the authors. 
7 The question goes to some length to detail the consequences of a banking crisis. This formulation was preferred by 
the polling agency in lieu of a shorter formulation, such as, “In your opinion, how likely is it that the Bulgarian 
banking system will experience a crisis?” to make sure that respondents interpreted the term banking crisis in the 
same way. This has been the preferred approach in national household and consumer surveys where a large number 
of the sampled individuals are not experts on economics.    9 
 
banking crisis is likely or very likely at the five year horizon.  At that horizon, only about a third 
of the respondents believed that a banking crisis was unlikely or very unlikely (categories 4 and 
5).  The survey also inquired about experiences during the 1996 crisis: 
 
“Did you or members of your household lose money during the 1996 crisis?”  
 
Respondents could answer: 1) we lost a large amount; 2) we lost some money; 3) we didn’t lose 
anything; or 4) I don’t know.  Table II shows that well over 40 percent of the respondents 
reported experiencing a loss with over 10% experiencing a large loss.     
  The dependent variable used in all estimations is based on the question about 
expectations of a banking crisis.  It is constructed as a dummy variable equal to 1 for responses 
of high and very high likelihood of a crisis (categories 1 and 2), and zero otherwise.  We call this 
variable CRISIS.  We estimate the models using the probit methodology with Huber/White 
robust standard errors.  To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report the marginal 
effects instead of the estimated probit coefficients so that we can discuss not only the direction of 
the effects but also their sizes.
8   
Our independent variable of primary interest is a measure of past experience and is based 
on the question about losses during the 1996 crisis.  We construct a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for “some loss” and “lost a lot” and zero otherwise.  We call this variable LOSS.  We 
also report estimates where we distinguish between losses with different magnitude, i.e. between 
respondents who lost some money (SOME LOSS) and respondents who lost a lot (LOST A 
LOT).  Hence, our empirical specification is as follows, 
 
(1)          Pr (CRISISi)  =  φ ( α  +  β LOSSi  +  γ Xi) + ui 
 
where i indexes the individual respondents to the survey, Xi is a set of control variables and ui is 
a random term.  We expect to find β > 0. Our benchmark estimation includes the following 
control variables: AGE in years; EDUCATION measured as a dummy variable taking the value 
                                                 
8 An ordered probit model that uses all categories of the crisis expectations instead of the dummy variable yields the 
same results. We opted to use a simpler dependent variable and probit to make the interpretation of the coefficients 
more straightforward.   10 
 
1 for respondents with university education, college or post-graduate education, and 0 
otherwise
9;  INCOME reported in local currency; and FEMALE equal to 1 for female 
respondents and 0 otherwise.  Appendix 1 summarizes all survey questions used in the paper and 
Appendix 2 provides summary statistics.  
Our discussion in the theory section suggests that the expectations of respondents who 
engage in more information processing activity (IPA) to acquire knowledge about the economy 
will be affected less, if at all, by previous losses.  Therefore, we also estimate the following two 
equations: 
 
(2)          Pr (CRISISi | IPA ≤ IPA*)  =  φ ( αj  +  βj LOSSi  +  γj Xi) + ui 
(3)               Pr (CRISISi | IPA > IPA*)  =  φ ( αk  +  βk LOSSi  +  γk Xi) + ui 
 
where IPA > IPA* indicates an assessment that the returns from acquiring knowledge about the 
economy exceeds a given threshold and, respectively, IPA ≤ IPA* indicates that costs are 
relatively high compared to the gains from knowledge acquisition.  Our hypotheses are βj > 0 and 
βk = 0.  Estimating two separate equations as opposed to one equation with IPA interacted with 
LOSS allows for the possibility that the two subsamples are structurally different, yielding more 
reliable estimates.  
We use three variables to distinguish between more informed and less informed 
individuals and to split the sample to separately estimate equations (2) and (3).  First, we use 
EDUCATION to proxy for individuals’ cost of staying informed about the economy.  While 
more education does not necessarily imply better knowledge about the economy, more educated 
respondents are likely to face lower costs to collecting and analyzing information from the media 
and other information sources that provide such information.  We estimate equation (3) for 
respondents with post-high school education and equation (2) for those with high school or less. 
Second, we use INCOME to proxy for peoples’ motivation to stay informed.  People with higher 
income might have greater savings and would therefore be motivated to keep track of economic 
developments.  We split the sample around the median income bracket and, again, estimate 
equations (2) and (3).  Third, we use the answers to the following question:  
                                                 
9 We obtain similar effects with alternative education variables separating holders of high school diplomas from 
those with university degrees and people with less than high school education.  11 
 
 
“Inflation in Bulgaria has been below 15% for the past 5 years.” 
 
to construct the variable INFORMED which equals 1 for respondents who agreed or strongly 
agreed with that statement, and 0 otherwise.  Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed are 
considered informed as the statement is factually correct.  The survey results indicate that only a 
quarter of the respondents were informed about past inflation in the country, with the vast 
majority answering they could not give an answer.  Again, we split the sample according to these 
responses and separately estimate equations (2) and (3). 
  
V.  Empirical Results 
The estimations in Table III show that losses during the 1996 crisis affect expectations.  
The LOSS variable is positive and statistically significant at all time horizons.  People who 
reported a loss in 1996 were 6 percentage points more likely to expect a new crisis in the next six 
months compared to people who had no losses, 8 percent more likely during the next 1 year and 
11 percent more likely in the next five years.  The effect of losses on expectations is even 
stronger if we differentiate between people who experienced some loss and those who 
experienced a large loss.  Respondents who lost a large amount in 1996 were 23 percentage 
points more likely to expect a crisis in the next five years compared to respondents who did not 
lose anything.  They were also 16 percentage points more likely to expect a crisis compared to 
respondents who lost a smaller amount.
10  Therefore, the magnitude of the loss makes a 
substantial difference.  This underlines the importance of personal experiences: expectations are 
influenced by the extent to which an individual was affected by the crisis, and not simply by the 
awareness that a crisis happened.  Looking at the demographic variables, age, education, and 
gender have no statistically significant effects on expectations.  Only income is statistically 
significant at the six months horizon, with higher income associated with a lower likelihood of a 
crisis, but the effect disappears over longer time horizons.        
 
Third Underlying Factors 
                                                 
10 The difference 0.234 – 0.078 = 0.156 is statistically significant. 12 
 
While straightforward at first glance, estimating equation (1) presents important 
challenges that have to be resolved before we can be certain of the robustness of the estimated 
relationships.  First, it is possible that the respondents’ stated likelihood of a banking crisis and 
their recollection of past losses are driven by a third underlying factor.  Respondents who possess 
greater knowledge about the economy might recognize that a banking crisis is less likely in the 
current environment, but they might also have been able to avert losses during the 1996 crisis by 
anticipating it.  It would then be the extent of their information about the economy that 
contributes to both a lower reported likelihood of a future banking crisis and a lower reported 
loss.  To account for that possibility, in addition to EDUCATION and INCOME which proxy for 
peoples’ ability and motivation to stay informed, we also include the variable INFORMED as an 
additional control variable in Table IV.  The results show that LOSS remains positive and 
statistically significant.  
  Furthermore, expectations might be driven by people’s risk attitudes.  Although in 
principle how an individual assesses the likelihood of an event (expectations formation) should 
be independent from that individual’s risk attitudes, it is possible that people who are less 
tolerant to risk might tend to magnify the likelihood of negative events.  They might also be 
more likely to magnify how negatively they were affected in 1996.  Conversely, people who are 
more tolerant to risk might downplay their losses in 1996 as well as the likelihood of a new 
crisis.  Not accounting for risk attitudes could therefore produce biased estimates on the LOSS 
variable.  To address this potential problem, we include a measure of risk attitudes based on 
respondents’ answers to the following question: 
 
“Suppose that I give you 1000 leva. You can keep the money or you can choose to 
participate in a game. I will throw a coin. If “heads” you win 1500 leva, if “tails” you 
win 900 leva. Do you prefer to play the game or to keep the 1000 leva?”
11 
 
We constructed a dummy variable Risk that equals 1 for respondents who prefer to play the 
game and 0 otherwise.  Note that only 28 percent of the respondents preferred to play the game 
despite the heavy odds in their favor.  The results in Table IV show that the LOSS variable 
remains statistically significant while RISK and INFORMED are not statistically significant.  
                                                 
11 1000 leva is equivalent to about two average monthly salaries. 13 
 
 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
A second concern about estimating equation (1) is that of reverse causality, i.e. 
respondents who expect a crisis might also report a loss.  In a strict sense, reverse causality is 
unlikely as the loss question refers to an event well into the past that should not influence 
expectations today.  However, respondents who expect a crisis might incorrectly recall that they 
had experienced a loss, possibly to rationalize their expectations.  We doubt that the respondents 
were making this link since the two questions were separated in the survey by 24 other questions 
(that have little relevance to the topic of this paper).  Yet, checking for reverse causality with the 
use of instrumental variables can give us more confidence in the results.  
The use of instrumental variables helps address one additional potential problem.  It is 
reasonable to suppose that people do not have a good recollection of what happened 12 years 
ago.  Some people might magnify the severity of their experiences while others might tend to 
forget easily.  Memory bias has been recorded in various surveys asking respondents to recall 
past events.
12  The 1996 crisis is an important event in Bulgaria’s transition history and it is 
unlikely that people have forgotten it.  Politicians, economists and the media make frequent 
references to these times.  Yet, these reminders might also magnify people’s beliefs about their 
past losses.   
We use two variables as instruments.  One of them makes use of the minority status of 
some of Bulgaria’s citizens.  About 6 percent of the population belongs to the Roma minority.  
As elsewhere, minorities have less access to financial services, all else equal.
13  This is especially 
true of the Roma minorities that are typically not well integrated in East European countries.  
This makes minority status useful in our case because, with less participation in formal banking, 
minority citizens might have been less exposed to loss during the banking crisis.  Yet, whether or 
not a citizen belongs to a minority group should not affect their expectations of a banking crisis 
directly.  
                                                 
12 See Gilbert (2007) for an excellent account of how memory can be biased in forming expectations about how 
choices can affect one’s happiness. 
13 Assessing the 2001 Survey on Income and Program Participation, a nationally representative sample of US 
households, Osili and Paulson (2009) find that, all else equal, while 67 percent of the native born household have 
checking accounts, only 59 percent of black native born households have savings accounts. 14 
 
The second variable we use as an instrument is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
respondents who are less than 32 years old, and zero otherwise.  Respondents who were less than 
32 years old at the time of the survey were younger than 20 when the banking crisis occurred. 
They are therefore less likely to have had funds in a banking account and to report losses than 
older respondents while, at the same time, their age does not influence their expectations.  More 
precisely, the crisis could affect the expectations of younger respondents but only through their 
experiences with the 1996 crisis.  This makes the variable suitable as an instrument.
14 
The instrumental variables estimations are reported in Table V.  We use a two stage OLS 
estimator with robust standard errors as opposed to a probit model with an endogenous 
explanatory variable.  This creates the potential for predicted values falling outside the unit 
interval.  However, the procedure allows us to instrument for a dichotomous explanatory variable 
(LOSS) whereas standard estimation procedures are applicable only for continuous endogenous 
explanatory variables.  Furthermore, only 4 out of the 805 observations used in the estimations 
fall outside the [0, 1] interval.   
The results in Table V show that LOSS is positive and statistically significant across all 
forecast horizons.  We report three tests that validate the choice of instruments.  The null 
hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Test is that the endogenous regressor (LOSS) is not 
identified by the instruments.  The null was rejected at the 1 percent level providing evidence 
that the excluded instruments explain the endogenous variable.  This is confirmed by the 
F-statistic that is also significant at the 1 percent level.  The F-statistic also exceeds the rule of 
thumb threshold (F  >  10) proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997).  The null hypothesis of the 
Hansen J Test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the stage 
two equation.  We fail to reject the null of the Hansen J Test indicating that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residuals in the stage two equation.
15 
Based on the estimations reported above, we can conclude that experiencing a loss during 
a banking crisis more than a decade ago significantly increases the expectations of a new crisis.   
                                                 
14 Note that the question about losses refers to personal as well as household losses. Therefore, many young 
respondents reported losses but as a smaller percent compared to older respondents.  In other words, the variable 
does not predict perfectly the likelihood of a loss, making it suitable as an instrument.  
15 We obtained similar results after adding a third instrumental variable: the place of residence of a respondent. The 
variable was used on the principle that residents of the capital Sofia have greater access to financial services because 
many bank branches are located there. In contrast, residents of rural areas have substantially less access to banking 
services. This affects their losses during a crisis but not necessarily their expectations of a new crisis.  15 
 
 
Sophisticated and Naïve Individuals  
Next, we estimate equations (2) and (3) after splitting the sample into two groups using 
the responses to the question about past inflation, then income and then education.  The results, 
reported in Table VI indicate that experiences of a loss in the 1996 crisis do not affect the 
expectations of the more “sophisticated” respondents using any of the three criteria associated 
with information processing activity.  In contrast, for the less informed, “naïve” groups, the prior 
experience of a loss enters significantly in the regressions explaining the expectations whether 
the sample split is from education, income or responses to the question on inflation.  The results 
are consistent with our hypothesis that more sophisticated actors can process information about 
changing structures and adapt their expectations accordingly while expectations of relatively 
naïve actors are more likely to rely on past, particularly negative, experiences.
16 The results are 
robust to changes in the sample dividing point in both directions for both education and income. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks  
The results presented in this paper show that prior negative experiences with a banking 
crisis elevate expectations of a new crisis and that this effect persists for a long time period, 
twelve years in our study.  This result is robust to various econometric specifications and 
robustness tests.   
Although the results are based on a survey from Bulgaria, we suppose that the same 
effect would be observed in other countries where people lost money during a banking crisis.  
Yet, Bulgaria might be different.  Its rapid economic and political transformation might loosen 
the ties between past and present as the past is less indicative of the future.  On the other hand, its 
short history with capitalism gives people a limited number of observations about how the 
economy functions.  In this case, a banking crisis might be more influential on expectations 
compared to other countries where the social and personal memories contain a number of ups 
                                                 
16 Using three different variables to separate between more and less informed individuals provides a useful 
robustness test. It is conceivable that people who lost money in 1996 feel more motivated to stay informed about the 
economy. Then, the crisis would affect not only expectations but also the variable INFORMED. Losing money 
during the crisis might also have affected some people’s long-term income level. These hypotheses are not 
supported by our data - people who lost money in 1996 are not more likely to be informed about the economy and 
don’t have lower (or higher) incomes. Yet, using education as an additional variable gives us further confidence in 
the results as the crisis is unlikely to affect peoples’ long-term education levels.  16 
 
and downs.  We hope that future studies with data from other countries can shed light on the 
broader relevance of our findings.  
The important role of financial development in economic growth has come to be accepted 
since the pioneering work of King and Levine (1993).  Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and 
Knack and Keefer (1997), among others, show that trust is an essential determinant of financial 
development.  Incomplete trust leads to lower than optimal levels of financial intermediation, 
with broader effects on savings and investment behavior.  Yet most studies of banking crisis 
focus only on resolving causality and on the short-term output contractions.  The question of 
long-term negative effects has received very little attention.  In one study, IADB, 2004, the 
authors find that a banking crisis reduces long-term economic growth by about 1 percentage 
point.  While the paper doesn’t investigate the channels of this effect, our results suggest that a 
crisis’ persistent effect on expectations of future crisis may affect long-term decision-making, 
producing a drag on economic growth for a number of years after the crisis.  Based on the IADB 
study and our analysis using the Bulgarian survey data, we believe that investigating the long-
term consequences of banking crises is a promising line of research.   
Our results indicate that policy makers have an opportunity to influence the long term 
effects of a banking crisis.  Structural reforms to change the economy’s operations can reduce the 
persistent effect of a past crisis on expectations.  But, as our results show, this effect may be 
largely limited to a more “sophisticated” segment of the population who can recognize that the 
drivers of earlier crises are no longer a major issue.  Efforts of policymakers to encourage 
individuals to adapt their expectations in response to an improved economic environment 
following a crisis face a significant challenge and should take into account different segments of 
the population.  The most likely to change their expectations are those who did not experience a 
personal loss and those who are relatively well informed.  Efforts to decrease the costs of 
becoming informed, for example through public information campaigns, should accompany 
economic reform to increase that portion of the population who recognize changed economic 
circumstances and the lower relevance of past experiences.   
 17 
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Appendix 1. Variables and survey questions used in the empirical analysis. 
 
  Survey question  Definition of variable 
CRISIS  “In your opinion, how likely is it that 
the Bulgarian banking system will 
experience a crisis with several banks 
collapsing and depositors losing some 
of their savings during the next 6 
months/1 year/5 years?” 
1 = “Very likely” 
… 
5 = “Very unlikely” 
 
1 for very likely and likely (answers 1 
and 2), 0 otherwise 
LOSS/ 
LOST_A_LOT/ 
LOST SOME/ 
 
 
“Did you or members of your household 
lose money during the 1996 crisis?”  
1 = “We lost a large amount” 
2 = “We lost some money” 
3 = “We did not lose anything” 
 
1 if a respondent reported a loss 
(answers 1 and 2), 0 otherwise/ 
1 for large loss (answer 1), 0 otherwise/ 
1 for lost some (answer 2), 0 otherwise/ 
 
EDUCATION 
 
1 = “Elementary or no education” 
2 = “Primary” 
3 = “Secondary” 
4 = “College” 
5 = “Post-graduate degree” 
 
1 if college or post-graduate degree 
(answers 4 and 5), 0 otherwise 
INCOME  Total household income from all 
sources: choose from income brackets 
staring at 0 leva, at 100 leva intervals: 
1 = “0 – 100 leva” 
2 = “101 – 200 leva” 
…  
 
Income categories (monthly) reported 
by respondents, using the mid-value of 
each interval.  
AGE  Age in years. 
 
Age in years. 
FEMALE  Male / female 
 
1 for female, 0 for male 
INFORMED  “Inflation in Bulgaria has been below 
15% for the past 5 years.” 
1 = “Strongly agree” 
… 
5 = “Strongly disagree” 
 
1 for strongly agree and agree (answers 
1 and 2), 0 otherwise 
RISK  “Suppose that I give you 1000 leva. You 
can keep the money or you can choose 
to participate in a game. I will throw a 
coin. If “heads” you win 1500 leva, if 
“tails” you win 900 leva. Do you prefer 
to play the game or to keep the 1000 
1 if prefers to play the game, 0 
otherwise 20 
 
leva?” 
 21 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Summary statistics 
 
 Crisis_6m  Crisis_ 
12m 
Crisis_5y  Loss  Lost a lot  Some loss  Education  Income  Age  Female  Informed  Risk 
Mean  0.13 0.19 0.22 0.46 0.11 0.34 0.25 559  51.89  0.59 0.25 0.28 
St.  deviation  0.33 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.31 0.47 0.43 516  16.21  0.49 0.43 0.45 
Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50  18  0 0 0 
Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5500  89  1 1 1 
              
Correlations              
Crisis_6m  1.00             
Crisis_12m  0.70*  1.00            
Crisis_5y  0.45*  0.62*  1.00           
Loss  0.08*  0.10*  0.12*  1.00          
Lost  a  lot  0.05  0.06*  0.14*  0.40*  1.00         
Some  loss  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.77*  -0.26*  1.00        
Higher  0.03  0.06  0.06*  0.07*  0.03  0.06  1.00       
Income  -0.06*  0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01  0.27*  1.00         
Age  0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03  -0.07*  -0.49*  1.00       
Female  0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.05  -0.06*  1.00     
Informed  0.00 0.03 0.00  -0.07*  -0.04  -0.05 0.05  0.16*  -0.05  -0.04 1.00   
Risk  -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.14*  0.33*  -0.28*  -0.03  0.08* 1.00 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.  
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Table I  
Survey responses on banking crisis expectations. 
 (Percent respondents in each category) 
 
 
“In your opinion, how likely is it that the Bulgarian banking system will  
experience a crisis with several banks collapsing and  
depositors losing some of their savings?” 
  6 months   1 year  5 years 
Very likely 1 
2 
3 
4 
Very unlikely 5  
Don’t know/No Answer 
6.7 
6.5 
18.0 
 17.9 
31.0 
19.9 
9.6 
9.7 
17.9 
16.5 
24.9 
21.4 
13.9 
8.9 
14.5 
12.6 
18.5 
31.6 
Total   100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table II 
Survey responses on experience of the 1996 banking crisis. 
(Percent respondents in each category) 
 
 
“Did you or members of your household lose money 
during the 1996 crisis?” 
Lost a large amount 
Lost some amount 
We did not lose anything 
Don’t know/No Answer 
Total 
11.1 
31.1 
48.8 
9.0 
100.0 
                                
 24 
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Table III  
Losses during a banking crisis and expectations. 
Dependent variable: 1 if respondent believes that a banking crisis is likely or  
very likely, 0 otherwise. Probit analysis. 
 
 
 
6 months  1 year  5 years  6 months  1 year  5 years 
Loss   0.056** 
(0.024) 
0.080*** 
(0.028) 
0.115***
(0.030)      
Some Loss        0.055** 
(0.028) 
0.077** 
(0.033) 
0.078**
(0.035) 
Lost a lot        0.074* 
(0.043) 
0.103** 
(0.049) 
0.234***
(0.054) 
Age  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Income  -0.076** 
(0.033) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.023 
(0.028) 
-0.077** 
(0.033) 
-0.026 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.028) 
Education  0.042 
(0.031) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.032 
(0.037) 
0.042 
(0.031) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.037) 
Female  -0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.031) 
Chi 2(5) 
Chi 2(6) 
Obs. 
15.03*** 
 
805 
14.01** 
 
805 
15.78*** 
 
805 
 
15.11** 
805 
 
14.18** 
805 
 
24.11*** 
805 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV  26 
 
Robustness checks for additional underlying factors. 
Dependent variable: 1 if respondent believes that a banking crisis  
is likely or very likely, 0 otherwise. One year horizon. 
Probit analysis. 
 
 Adding 
“Informed” 
 
Adding 
“Risk” 
Loss   0.082***
(0.028) 
0.081*** 
(0.028) 
Age  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Income  -0.029 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
Education  0.053 
(0.035) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
Female  -0.037 
(0.029) 
-0.039 
(0.029) 
Informed  0.034 
(0.033)   
Risk     -0.033 
(0.033) 
Chi 2(# expl. variables) 
Observations 
14.99** 
        805 
14.97** 
       805 
Note: Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ***(**,*) indicates statistical  
significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.  
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Table V  
Instrumental variables estimation. 
 
 
 Six  months 
horizon 
 
One year 
horizon 
Five years 
horizon 
Loss  
(predicted value from  stage 1)  
0.365*** 
(0.106) 
0.556*** 
(0.133) 
0.659*** 
(0.161) 
Age  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Income  -0.062*** 
(0.021) 
-0.041 
(0.028) 
-0.041*** 
(0.032) 
Education  0.001 
(0.035) 
0.008 
(0.044) 
0.020 
(0.047) 
Female  0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.014 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.037) 
Observations 
F - Statistic  
Prob > F 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 
Hansen J statistic  
Hansen J statistic p-value 
          805 
16.59*** 
0.001 
20.489***
0.001 
0.983 
0.321 
          805 
16.59*** 
0.001 
20.489*** 
0.001 
0.282 
0.595 
          805 
16.59*** 
0.001 
20.489*** 
0.001 
2.535 
0.111 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10)  
percent level.  
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Table VI 
The expectations of “sophisticated” and “naïve” respondents.  
Dependent variable: 1 if respondent believes that a banking crisis  
is likely or very likely, 0 otherwise. One year horizon.  
Probit analysis. 
 
 
 
Information about the 
economy  Income level  Education level 
 
More 
informed 
Less 
informed 
Higher 
income 
Lower 
income 
More 
education 
Less 
education 
Loss  0.035 
(0.057) 
0.103*** 
(0.032) 
0.026 
(0.045) 
0.115*** 
(0.036) 
0.068 
(0.061) 
0.083*** 
(0.032) 
Age  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Income  -0.077* 
(0.046) 
-0.003 
(0.036) 
-0.086* 
(0.046) 
0.072 
(0.165) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
-0.018 
(0.031) 
Education  0.119* 
(0.068) 
0.019 
(0.040) 
0.044 
(0.049) 
0.052 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
 
Female  -0.054 
(0.057) 
-0.029 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.046) 
-0.055 
(0.038) 
-0.055 
(0.067) 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
Chi 2(5) 
Obs. 
5.82 
218 
12.82** 
587 
7.00 
331 
15.62*** 
474 
4.81 
194 
8.39* 
611 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent 
level.  
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